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This paper explores how small-arms aiming errors appear to vary with range. In particular it 
investigates the question of whether a “proximity effect” exists, reducing accuracy at close range. 
Data on small-arms hitting rates is sparse. The paper analyses nineteen sources of data, giving 83 
data points; combat data is augmented with data from police shootings, range trials, OR models and 
qualification scores. The paper explains the assumptions made in order to compensate for gaps in 
the data, such as target size.  
Data points are reduced to a common basis of angular error, which would produce the observed 
hitting rate if shooting at a visible static rectangular target at the stated known range. This subsumes 
all errors normally included in ballistic error budgets, plus the uncertainty of target location if firing 
at targets not clearly visible.  
The data available indicates that the accuracy of small-arms fire decreases with proximity to the 
target, so that the hitting rate does not increase as much as would otherwise be expected at closer 
ranges. The effect seems to apply across different types of data source, weapon, and fire, up to 
about 100 metres.  
The paper discusses possible explanations for the effect: prevalence of close terrain in the combat 
sample, restricted visibility, targets reducing their exposure time close to the enemy, uncertainty as 
to true target position, psychological stress due to enemy proximity, and a transition to pointed 
rather than aimed shooting. Each may be a contributory factor, but it is tentatively concluded that a 
hastier shooting style arising from psychological stress provides most of the explanation.  
Finally the paper suggests some directions for future work, the most important of which is clearly to 
add to the data available on this subject. 
Background 
Since the earliest days of operational research, practitioners have studied problems in hit 
probability. Such calculations are normally done by assuming a Gaussian dispersion of shots over the 
target, and calculating the proportion of the relevant Gaussian curve that covers the target.  A 
general assumption, when drawing up an error budget for a ballistic weapon, is that angular errors 
are constant with range to the target. One obvious exception is rangefinding error, which one would 
expect to grow with range. This paper explores the way small-arms aiming errors appear to vary with 
range in operational small-arms shooting. In particular it investigates the question of whether a 
“proximity effect” is observable, reducing accuracy at close range. 
The “proximity effect” is suggested in Brains & Bullets [Murray 2013], whereby defensive fire 
becomes less effective and an attacker’s forward movement might stall at about 50 metres. 
Unfortunately Brains & Bullets does not give references to the sources for this conclusion, nor any 
numerical estimate of the magnitude of the effect.  
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Two separate WW2 sources report psychological effects on the accuracy of infantry shooting against 
tanks. The effectiveness of PIAT shooting [WO 291/153] reports range trials in which the percentage 
of hits "…is noticeably greater with crossing and receding targets, and firers put this down to the 
'sense of hurry' that seems to exist when a tank is fast approaching. This appears to be a genuine 
effect, and not due to chance errors."  I conducted some further analysis and found no substantial 
effect of range on projectile dispersion, only of target aspect. The A45 flame gun versus the 
Panzerfaust [WO 291/1060] reports Panzerfaust hit probabilities from operational evidence, which 
show a substantial apparent drop in aiming accuracy with target proximity. The report states that 
"The disproportionally large number of misses at close range is thought to be due either to the fact 
that short-range firing is nerve-racking to the firer, or to the large angular velocities of the target as 
it reaches crossing point." As this report does not mention target orientation, it is impossible to 
comment on the influence of tank aspect on the firer’s nerves. 
The effectiveness of small arms fire is known to vary enormously with tactical circumstances.  On 
one hand, it is remarkable how far away you can be killed by a rifle bullet; on the other, it is amazing 
how close a shooter can be and still miss. If it were true that “short-range firing is nerve-racking to 
the firer” against personnel targets as well as tanks, this would go a long way to explain the 
apparently extreme variation. 
One hears folk tales to the effect that hitting a man requires the expenditure of his own weight in 
ammunition. Numerical data on the number of rounds needed to inflict a casualty is, however, very 
hard to come by. As Wallace and Crompton put it in 1946 [WO 291/965]: 
In general the amount of reliable information on almost any aspect of battle tends to be 
much smaller than is often supposed... These studies illustrate how slender is the basis on 
which much of the theory of war depends, and emphasise the need for more knowledge in 
many directions.  
 
Robinson [Robinson 1994] divides data into three categories, which he designates as A, B and C. 
Category C data is that which “are neither available nor can they be collected.” For a long time I 
thought that data on the number of bullets required to achieve results in combat might prove to be 
Category C, but it turns out that a few snippets are available, and can be supplemented with data 
from other sources that are somewhat alike. 
Data and Assumptions 
I collected data on the expected ballistic dispersion, hit probability, or hitting rate achieved by 
modern small arms from a number of sources. I have characterised the types of source as: 
Combat  In action against live enemy who can shoot back. May involve reduced 
visibility. 
Police shootings US police firearms incidents, with or without return fire. May involve reduced 
visibility. 
Range trials Shooting on a range as part of a trial, perhaps with “realistic” elements of 
shooter stress or target layout, but with good visibility and no return fire. 
Qualification score Shooting on a range to achieve a stated training standard, in good visibility and 
with little stress. 
OR model A figure given by OR analysts, typically for use in a computer simulation. 
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While it would obviously be preferable to collect data only from combat, the extreme sparsity of 
such sources makes it necessary to accept others.  See Annex A for the data collected. 
The data collected came from only 19 sources, and provided only 83 data points. Of these, 22 are 
from combat, 8 from Police shootings, 35 range trials, 5 qualification scores, and 13 OR models. The 
following table summarises the data sources used, in order of fruitfulness: 
Reference Source Title Data 
Points 
WO 291/476 Comparison of rifle, Bren and Sten guns, 1944 12 
Harris 1993 Spartan II: An Instructional High Resolution Land Combat Model, MSc thesis, Edwin 
H Harris, Air Force University, March 1993 
10 
WO 291/1668 WO 291/1668, Performance of small arms weapons including .280 (7mm) rifle, used 
in machine carbine role in Malaya, 1953 
9 
Aveni  2003 Officer-Involved Shootings: What We Didn't Know Has Hurt Us, Thomas J Aveni, Law 
and Order Magazine, August 2003 
8 
FB 181 1945 Film Bulletin No. 181, Army Pictorial Service, US Army Signal Corps, 1945 7 
Hall & Ross 
2009 
Bang on Target: Infantry Marksmanship and Combat Effectiveness in Viet Nam, Dr 
Bob Hall and Dr Andrew Ross, Australian Army Journal Vol. VI no. I, pp. 139-156 
6 
CDEC 1962 Rifle Platoon Firepower Experiment, US Army Combat Development Experimentation 
Center, Fort Ord, CA, March 1962 
6 
Lappi 2012 Jalkaväen tulen vaikutuksesta (On the Effect of Infantry Fire), 1954, in 
Computational Methods for Tactical Simulations, Esa Lappi, Helsinki, 2012 
4 
Jovanović et al 
2012 
The Effects of Basic Military Training on Shooting Tasks in Conditions of Sleep 
Deprivation, Mario Jovanović, Goran Sporiš, Josip Šopar, Dražen Harasin and Dario 
Matika, Kinesiology Vol. 44 no. 1 pp. 31-38, 2012 
4 
FM 3-22 9 2008 FM 3-22 9 2008, Rifle Marksmanship M16-/M4 Series Weapons, Department of the 
Army, Washington, DC, 12 August 2008 
3 
CQB 1961 Infantry Training Volume III, Ranges and Courses, Pamphlet no. 33, Close Quarter 
Shooting, the War Office, 1961 
2 
Scott et al 2015 The Effect of Stress on Marksmanship, Adam Scott, Rob Shaul and Sam McCue, 
Mountain Tactical Institute, Jackson, WY, 2015 
2 
Zuber 2010 The Mons Myth, Terence Zuber, The History Press, Stroud, 2010 2 
Lind et al 1971 
 
FAST-VAL: A Study of Close Air Support (A Briefing Summarizing the Comparisons of 
Model with Combat Results and Illustrating the Influence of Supporting Arms on Fire-
fight Outcomes) , J R Lind, K Harris, and S G Spring, R-811-PR, The Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica, CA, November 1971 
2 
PCD undated Good to Knows, Platoon Commanders Division, School of Infantry, Warminster, 
undated 
2 
Spring et al 
1971 
FAST-VAL: Case Study of an Attack in the DMZ, 8 October 1968,  S G Spring, J R Lind 
and K Harris,  R-818-PR, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, November 1971 
1 
WO 291/471 Weight of small-arms fire needed for various targets, 1944 1 
Ewell & Hunt 
1995 
Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment, Lt-
Gen Julian J Ewell and Maj-Gen Ira A Hunt, jr, Department of the Army, Washington 
DC, 1995 
1 
Mayne 1888 Infantry Fire Tactics, Charles Blair Mayne, Gale & Polden, Brompton, 1888 1 
Small Arms, Small Data 
4 
 
A source that does not directly specify an expected dispersion should ideally state the following: 
1. The weapon used 
2. The range to the target 
3. The dimensions of the target 
4. The type of fire delivered (aimed or pointed, burst or single shot) 
5. The conditions prevailing (darkness, brief target exposures, and so on) 
Very few sources stated all of these, so some assumptions had to be made.  
Most sources stated the weapons used unambiguously. One Finnish data source [Lappi 2012] 
characterised the weapons only by general class, but knowing the standard types of rifle, self-loading 
rifle, SMG and automatic rifle equipping the Finnish army at the time it is possible to be fairly sure 
what they are. Where “.303 rifle” is stated, it is considered irrelevant whether this is a No.1 or No.4 
rifle. I counted M1 and M2 carbines as rifles, and as both models (one single shot and the other 
selective fire) were lumped in together, arbitrarily categorised them as delivering single shot fire. 
The following table summarizes all the weapons that feature in the data collected, arranged into the 
weapon categories I have used: 
Rifle Martini-Henry, Mauser 98, Mosin, Lee-Enfield,  M1 or M2 carbine, SVT, SLR, M14, AK, 
AR15, M16, M4 
.303, 7.92x57, or 7.62x54R bolt-action rifle, or 7.62x51, 7.62x39, 7.62x33 or 5.56x45 
gas-operated self-loading or selective-fire rifle or carbine 
SMG Thompson, Suomi , MP40, Sten, M3, Owen 
.45 ACP or 9mm Luger blowback-operated SMG 
MG M1917, M1919, Lahti-Saloranta M26, lMG-34, Bren, sMG-42, M60, RPD 
7.62x63, 7.62x54R, 7.92x57, .303, 7.62x51 or 7.62x39 gas- or recoil-operated 
magazine- or belt-fed machine gun 
Handgun 9mm or 10mm automatic pistol or .38 Special revolver 
 
The range to the target is sometimes stated as a range band. In such cases I took the range to be half 
way between the start and end of the band. In the case of an open-ended band, such as “over 100 
yards”, I assumed the range band to have the same width as the band next to it. If a range was given 
in yards I have converted it to metres. 
The combat and police shooting sources never state the dimensions of the target, and those for 
range trials do not always do so. For range trials, it has been possible to estimate the sizes of UK 
figure 11 and US type E, type F, and 10-inch challenge targets.  For other cases I assumed a general 
target size of 0.5m by 0.5m, giving a target area of 0.25m2. This is smaller than the STANAG target 
area for a standing man (0.37m2), but close to the size of head-and-shoulders target commonly used 
to represent a prone man.  In the one combat case where the targets were known to be occupying 
slit trenches, I took the target area to be the same as that specified for men occupying slit trenches 
in [WO 291/471]. 
The type of fire delivered is never stated for combat and police shootings, and not always for the 
range trials. I have inferred it from the type of weapon used. MGs and SMGs are designed to be fired 
in bursts, so I assumed always were unless explicitly stated otherwise. Some rifles are capable only 
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of single shots (bolt-action and self-loading rifles), and I have ignored the occasional Australian 
practice of modifying the SLR to fire bursts. Selective-fire rifles (M14s, M16s and AKs) I assumed to 
be fired in single shots, except for the M16 in ambushes by the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) 
which I considered to be fired in bursts. The Croatian special forces practice of firing AKs using a 
“double tap” [Jovanović et al 2012] I counted as firing single shots, as each shot requires a distinct 
trigger pull – it is not a two-round burst. 
Some trials cases specify conditions, and all were in daylight, but again there is no information for 
combat and police shootings. A particular deficiency of the data is that, with the exception of one 
case [PCD undated], no information is given about the weight of enemy return fire. However, a 
significant proportion of 1ATF ambushes (42%) took place in darkness [Hall & Ross 2009]. The 
availability of night vision devices for 1ATF is not known, so the only data point known to be 
employing night vision equipment is the one from Ewell and Hunt, trained snipers using 
sniperscopes at night securing one hit in every six shots at an average range of 148 metres. The 
NYPD police shootings include up to 77% of cases in restricted lighting, and Baltimore PD 59% [Aveni 
2003]. Presumably there is some degree of street lighting, so this is not the same as night in the 
jungle.  
Much of the combat data comes from two sources, one on the 1ATF in Vietnam [Hall & Ross 1993] 
and the other on British troops in Malaya [WO 291/1668 1953]. These may not be representative of 
the full range of close combat experience in the 20th century.  In both cases combat occurred at close 
range in close terrain. In the Vietnam actions the average combat range was 23 metres, and in 
Malaya ambushes took place at an average range of 33m and patrol encounters 70m.  
It is not possible to say much about the levels of skill and experience of the troops in the combat 
examples, except to say that all are from forces recruited at least partly by conscription. All those 
from regular forces would have received sound basic training in fieldcraft and weapon handling, 
whereas the standards of irregular opponents (for whom no hitting rates are reported) might not 
have been so high. The only cases involving troops that might be considered in any sense “elite” are 
the data points from US snipers from [Ewell & Hunt 1995] and from the action at Rasau [PCB 
undated] where a force including Indonesian commandos confronted a relatively poorly prepared 
force from the HQ company of a Gurkha battalion. None of the cases covered by the data appear to 
involve AFVs, artillery preparation or formal assaults – even at Rasau, where shouts of “charge!” 
were heard, but not apparently obeyed. It seems, therefore, that whatever levels of psychological 
stress prevailed in these actions, they do not represent such extreme and debilitating levels as might 
apply on the receiving end of a close assault following an artillery bombardment. 
All the police shootings occurred at very close ranges, being carried out with handguns. The data 
summarize the broad range of officer-involved shootings, and it is not known what proportion of the 
incidents involved return fire. Evidently the standard of criminal shooting might vary widely, but 
again no hitting rates are reported. 
Method 
I reduced all data obtained to the common form of an expected ballistic dispersion, in mils (using the 
NATO mil, 1/6400 of a circle), as a single simple numerical characterisation of the accuracy of the 
shooting. This measure of accuracy seems preferable to P(hit) or bullets per hit because it is 
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independent of target size, and nominally independent of range. It therefore enables a fair 
comparison between the accuracy of shooting at targets of different sizes (degrees of exposure) at 
different ranges. 
Where data gave ballistic dispersions (usually from OR models) I used it directly. Where the data 
gave hit probabilities or hitting rates I ran it through a “reverse P(hit)” spreadsheet written for the 
purpose. Given the number of shots needed to secure a hit, the range, and the target dimensions, 
this tries to find the angular dispersion of shooting that would just achieve the specified hitting rate.   
Usually I assume that the vertical and horizontal components of overall dispersion are the same. This 
is certainly a reasonable assumption for modern flat-shooting rifle ammunition up to 300 metres. 
Above 300m, range estimation errors begin to produce an increasingly significant vertical 
component. However, there are any number of possible answers to the reverse P(hit) problem if 
horizontal and vertical elements are allowed to vary separately. 
A conventional method of calculating P(hit) on a rectangular target is to find, for each target 
dimension, the proportion of a Gaussian curve covered by the target. This gives the P(hit) in that 
dimension, and multiplying the P(hit) in elevation by the P(hit) in azimuth gives the overall P(hit). For 
more detail on the method, see for example exercises 5 and 6 in [Shephard et al 1988]. The “reverse 
P(hit)” spreadsheet performs the opposite calculation, starting with the P(hit) and, assuming a 
square target, taking its square root to find the P(hit) in each dimension. Knowing the target 
dimensions, it then finds the standard deviation of the Gaussian curve that would have a fraction of 
itself covered that would correspond to the P(hit).  In Microsoft Excel terms, this calculation uses the 
NORMSINV function, rather than the NORMSDIST used in conventional P(hit) calculations.  
In order to confirm the results, I fed the derived dispersion into a P(hit) calculator to check that it 
produced the specified hitting rate on the specified target at the stated range.  
The dispersion so calculated is a global measure of all causes of shooting inaccuracy. Given the 
precision of which even mass-produced firearms and ammunition are capable, most of this 
inaccuracy will come from sources that are either human or tactical factors, rather than technical 
ones. Human factors might include decreased aiming accuracy, poor holding, or trigger-snatching as 
a result of stress. Tactical factors might include the necessity of snap-shooting against targets 
exposed only briefly, or by shooters popping up for a short interval before resuming cover. They may 
also include the angular uncertainty entailed in firing into cover where a target was recently seen to 
disappear; much combat shooting is conducted without a clearly-visible human target, even at close 
ranges. 
I then charted the processed dispersion data as a log:log scatter plot of dispersion against range, and 
plotted a linear trend line [see Figure 1]. 
This showed a definite tendency for dispersion to increase at closer ranges, contrary to the 
assumption that it should remain constant with range. 




By plotting different partitionings of the data into subsets, I investigated a number of possible 
explanations for this effect. 
Results 
Different partitonings of data explored were: 
1. Grouped by source [Figure 2] 
The trend remained evident for each type of data source considered separately. The trend 
line for combat, police shootings and qualification scores was noticeably steeper than that 
for range trials or OR models. 
As expected, the general levels of dispersion for the non-combat sources were lower than 
those for combat and police shootings. However some trials results overlapped with the 
combat and police shooting results, and OR models used dispersions towards the high end of 
the trials results. 
 
2. Grouped by weapon type [Figure 3] 
Handguns and sub-machine guns fire low-velocity pistol cartridges from short barrels. This 
makes them inherently less accurate weapons than rifles and MGs, which fire high-velocity 
rifle cartridges from long barrels. One might therefore expect handguns and SMGs to be 
used only at short ranges, whereas rifles and MGs can be used at short or long ranges. This 
might explain the overall trend if results from the inaccurate weapons are concentrated at 
the close ranges. 
The trend of increased dispersion with proximity remained clearly visible for handguns (8 






















Figure 1: All Data
Angular dispersion Overall trend
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handguns and rifles. Unexpectedly the reverse trend was shown for SMGs (13 cases). This 
might have been influenced by three very accurate results firing single shots at close range 








































Figure 2: Partitioned by Source Type
Range trial Combat Police shootings Qual firing

































Figure 3: Partitioned by Weapon Type
Rifle Handgun MG Panzerfaust SMG
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3. Grouped by fire type [Figure 4] 
The trend of increased dispersion with proximity remained clearly visible for both burst-
firing and single-shot weapons. The trend line was steeper for burst-firing weapons than for 
single shot.  
 
 
4. Grouped by range [Figures 5 to 8] 
One might reasonably expect to see a transition from deliberate aimed fire to instinctive 
pointed fire as the range closes to close quarter battle (CQB), as described in [Stavers 1944]. 
Rowland and Speight’s rural infantry battle model takes 30 metres as changeover point to 
CQB; the US Army defines it as 50 metres. The data was partitioned in four different ways, at 
30, 50, 75 and 100 metres. 
A break at 30 metres showed a slightly steeper trend line at 30m and below (31 cases) 
compared with over 30m (50 cases). See Figure 5. 
A break at 50m (the most even range partitioning possible, with 39 cases at 50m or below 
and 42 cases over 50m) showed trend lines of very similar slope, but still slightly steeper at 
the closer ranges. See Figure 6. 
A break at 75m showed the usual trend at 75m and below (51 cases), but an almost flat 
trend line over 75m (30 cases). See Figure 7. 
A break at 100m showed the usual trend at 100m and below (54 cases), but above 100m (27 
cases) the trend reverses, showing a slight increase in dispersion with increased range. This 
is the direction of trend one would expect if factors such as crosswind drift and rangefinding 
























Figure 4: Partitioned by Fire Type
Bursts Singles Bursts trend Singles trend































Figure 5: Break at 30 metres

























Figure 6: Break at 50 metres
50m and under Over 50m





Within the limits of the sparse available data, it has been shown that the angular dispersion of small 

























Figure 7: Break at 75 metres

























Figure 8: Break at 100 metres
100m and under Over 100m
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observable in combat and police shooting data. The trend does not seem to be accounted for by 
different weapon types used, or whether firing bursts or single shots.  
Discussion 
Some of the numbers of rounds required to secure a hit, and hence the derived dispersion, seem 
large; can it really need over 200 rounds from an SLR to secure one hit in a close-range ambush? 
Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that the American police departments, 1ATF in Vietnam and 
British forces in Malaya all handsomely outshot their opponents. 
414 of 980 ambushes by 1ATF (42%) occurred at night. 77% of the NYPD police shootings occurred in 
low light conditions. At night it may be effectively impossible to use the weapon's sights unless a 
specialist night sight is fitted. In seems that few police shooters used their sights; an NYPD report of 
1981 [Aveni  2003] said that in 70% of reported cases, there was no indication that officers had 
aligned their sights. For 1ATF in the jungle – and doubtless to a considerable extent for British troops 
in Malaya – a lot of shooting was done without a visible target, but into a likely target area – what 
the Rhodesian Light Infantry used to call “drake shooting”. The “inverse P(hit)” method produces 
apparently high dispersions because it treats the question as an aimed fire problem against a visible 
target. The dispersion figure remains a fair measure of the accuracy with which the fire falls, but it 
must be borne in mind that a great deal of the angular error represents uncertainty as to the target's 
position, rather than any inability by the shooter to aim the weapon effectively. This explains, for 
example, why MGs seem to be associated with such high dispersions at close ranges; they are at 
least as accurate as the rifles which show much lower dispersions, but, being capable of high rates of 
fire, are used to “hose down” likely cover.  
Considering all the foregoing, it might be argued that the apparent effect of increased dispersion at 
close range in combat applies only because so many of the close range cases occurred in dense 
cover, where the position of the target may be quite uncertain.  We might assume that the average 
uncertainty as to a target soldier’s true position was three metres either way – which appears 
reasonable if he has executed something like the British Army’s contract drill of “Dash, down, crawl, 
observe, sights, fire.” Plotting the angle subtended by three metres at different ranges produces a 
curve strikingly similar to that produced by the data from combat engagements.    
Against this, there is the point that a strong proximity effect is observed in Police shootings, where 
no terrain effect or other reason for positional uncertainty is applicable.  Further, if all the 1ATF and 
Malaya data points are removed – rather a shame, as they are by far the best combat data I have 
found so far – the downward trend of dispersion with range remains obstinately in place, albeit with 
a slightly less steep gradient; see Figure 9. 
A further check is provided by plotting the data points for combat firings of the Panzerfaust. The 
proximity of a tank may be considered more or less intimidating than that of infantry, but vegetation 
makes poor concealment for tanks at the close ranges applicable, and it would be highly unusual to 
employ anti-tank weapons, especially one-shot devices such as Panzerfaust, on the “drake shooting” 
principle.  Notice the similarity between the Panzerfaust trend line and those for Police shootings 
and other combat shooting, as shown in Figure 2. 
 




Two more points seem to confirm as genuine the effect of increased dispersion with increased 
proximity. One is that the aiming dispersions given for the SPARTAN II model [Harris 1993] show just 
such a trend, albeit a very gentle one. Why they do so is not explained in Harris' thesis, which merely 
states that the figures come from AMSAA. Presumably some AMSAA analyst, at some time, has had 
evidence to make them believe such an effect exists. The other is the comparison of the covering fire 
shoots in the US platoon firepower experiment [CDEC 1962]. These shoots – each conducted 20 
times – were at ranges of 250 and 400 metres. Weapon and ammunition allocations and target 
arrays were the same in each case, so all factors seem to have been controlled out except range and 
time allowed, which was eight minutes at 400m case as against five minutes at 250m. At 400m, both 
M14 rifles and M60 MGs seem to have shot with at least a mil more accuracy than at 250m.  
Presumably the slower pace of fire allowed for more accurate aiming, but the ammunition 
allocations (100 rounds per rifle, 300 rounds per MG) correspond to rates of 20 rds/min for the rifle 
and 60 rds/min for the MG over five minutes. 20 rds/min was the doctrinal British rapid rate for the 
SLR, and in the author's experience does not place the shooter under any great time pressure. A rate 
of 60 rds/min for a machine gun is positively leisurely, being half the British doctrinal rapid rate for 
the Bren. 
That the qualification scores show the tendency is perhaps a surprise, but it is because one standard 
is for shooting at long range [FM 3-22 9 2008] and the other for CQB [CQB 1961]. The military has 
long acknowledged the possible need for a transition to quicker, less accurately aimed shooting at 
close ranges. Captain Stephen Stavers, writing in Infantry Journal for December 1944, says [Stavers 
1944]: 





















Figure 9: All Data less Jungles
No jungles Overall trend
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The function of snap shooting is clear. It is intended for short range (twenty yards and under) 
combat firing where troops are moving quickly toward each other. In such situations it has 
been observed that almost every man's instinctive reaction is to fire quickly, without stopping 
to bring the weapon to his shoulder.  
While this is described as an instinctive reaction, it would also appear to be a rational one in that the 
shooter is trading the accuracy of aimed fire for the speed of pointed fire. If one believes that a near 
miss will have a useful suppressive effect, it is rational to trade quite a lot of accuracy for speed. 
Then again, a stressed shooter may have no choice in the matter:  Grossman and Christensen 
[Grossman & Christensen 2004] report that one of the effects of high doses of adrenalin in combat is 
loss of close vision. In this case the shooter cannot align the sights of his weapon because he cannot 
see them, and pointed fire is the only remaining option. 
Speight and Rowland [Speight & Rowland 2006] have proposed a model of the typical rural infantry 
battle that divides the action into three range bands, delimited by the transition ranges 30m and 
300m. I suggest that it might be useful to think of each of these range bands as being characterised 
by a dominant mode of shooting.  
Beyond 300m, individual targets are not generally discernible, so areas fire on suspected enemy 
positions will dominate. This is now the province of mortars and tripod-mounted MGs. In the early 
20th century, armies trained to engage massed targets with massed rifle fire at ranges up to 2000 
metres. Paul  Syms has referred to this as employing the rifles as a “collective machine gun”, and 
indeed some SMLEs were fitted with dial sights for this type of fire. Hitting an enemy at this range is 
a matter of density of bullets against density of targets, rather than precision of aim. 
At 300m, the attacking infantry unmask, and defenders can commence aimed fire at individual 
targets. The attackers, with less idea of the whereabouts of the defenders, will still be conducting 
mostly area fire, with the intention of suppressing the defenders' fire. 
Finally, at 30m, the opposing sides enter close combat. One might assume that this is the domain of 
instinctive rather than aimed shooting; it is also close enough to throw grenades. 
It is surely not too fanciful to imagine that a good deal of the increase in dispersion with proximity is 
due to psychological effects. Indeed two of the data sources used report trials specifically designed 
to measure the decrease of aiming accuracy caused by physical stress [Scott et al 2015] and sleep 
deprivation [Jovanović et al 2012]. The shooter may feel more urgency to engage a closer target; the 
target may increase his speed of movement and reduce his exposure times for closer fire. Both sides 
may suffer a reduction in accuracy from the suppressive effect of enemy fire, presumably greater at 
close range. That the effect should appear more pronounced in combat than on trials may be 
ascribed to greater stress. It may be no more than coincidence, but I am struck by the fact that the 
apparent “kink” in the trend at about 100 metres corresponds closely to the range attributed by 
Rowland [Rowland 2006] to the onset of shock from infantry attack.  
Conclusions 
The most obvious conclusion is that the available data is too sparse to form any statistically rigorous 
conclusions. However the nature of combat makes it hard to overcome this sparsity, and it would be 
a shame to disregard what seems to be a genuine effect for lack of statistical rigour. 
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The most obvious conclusion from the data gathered is to reinforce David Rowland’s finding 
[Rowland 2006] that shooting in combat is much, much worse than it is on the range. Operational 
researchers should, therefore, be highly sceptical of any results based on range firing that purport to 
reflect the realities of combat. 
It seems clear from the data available that, for one reason or another, the accuracy of small-arms 
fire decreases with proximity to the target, so that the hitting rate does not increase as much as 
would otherwise be expected at closer ranges.  
Even from the small amount of data collected, it is striking that the decrease in aiming accuracy with 
proximity is observable in data from all kinds of sources, strongly so for combat and police shootings. 
The tendency is observed for both burst and single shot fire, and, with the exception of an 
anomalous result for SMGs, across all weapon types.  
It may be possible to account for much of the effect by the shooter’s uncertainty as to the precise 
position of the target in dense vegetation. However, the persistence of the effect when “jungle” 
cases are removed from the data, and the strong proximity effect seen in Police shootings where the 
effect of vegetation can be discounted, strongly suggest that positional uncertainty does not 
completely explain the effect. My own belief is that the psychological effect of enemy proximity 
must play a large part, but it is not clear how much of this effect is due to enemy fire and how much 
to his mere presence.  
If a psychological stress reaction is at work on weapon aiming accuracy, then an implication for 
combat modellers is that suppression effects in combat models should be represented by a stress-
induced reduction in shooting accuracy, as well as by episodic total cessation of firing. Combat 
modellers should also consider incorporating a transition to less accurate shooting techniques at 
some range between 50m and 100m. Combat models might – and some do – incorporate a 
mechanism for direct-fire engagement of targets whose position is not known with absolute 
precision. Models intended to show the contribution to combat effectiveness of new sensors are 
likely to overestimate that contribution if no allowance is made for the fact that small arms fire can 
be directed effectively at targets less than perfectly acquired, or, in the case of “prophylactic fire”, 
not acquired at all. 
The most obvious need for further work is to expand the set of data available. In particular, it is 
desirable to find more combat data for the longer ranges. 
It would be interesting to see if suitable data could be collected from two-sided exercises using  
Simunition. The threat of the mild pain of Simunition impact provides a better simulacrum of the 
stress of combat than anything else that can ethically be done in a peacetime exercise, and it would 
be interesting to see how rounds-per-hit and aiming dispersion compare with the combat data so far 
collected. It would also be interesting to see if soldiers conducting fire and movement do, indeed, 
reduce their exposure times with proximity to the enemy is some predictable way. The principal 
limitation of Simunition is that it is only suitable for use at close range. Some ingenuity would be 
required to devise and experiment to assess the accuracy of shooters engaging long-ranged targets 
while themselves being shot at with Simunition. 
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If it is assumed that it is rational to trade speed for accuracy as the range of engagement closes, then 
it would be relatively straightforward to devise some simple computer simulation to test the best 
trade to make. One can conceive of such an experiment being conducted using a continuous scale of 
speed against accuracy, or a single well-defined transition between aimed and pointed fire. While 
such simulations do nothing to add to our store of historical data, it would be interesting to see how 
much of the low accuracy of combat shooting and the apparent proximity effect could potentially be 
explained as resulting from rational decisions. 
It seems clear that there is still a great deal of work to do in many directions before we can claim to 
have believable numerical models of close combat. 
□ 
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Annex A: Data sources used and data extracted 
Source Trial type Trial size Data given Assumptions 
FM 3-22 9 2008 Qual score N/A Hitting rate  
WO 291/476 Range trial 20 rds at 25 yds  90% zone at 25 yds 4ft by 1ft targets 
FB 181 1945 Range trial 20 rds SMGs, 30 rds 
MGs 
Hitting  rate Tgt size judged from 
film 
CQB 1961 Qual score N/A Hitting rate Fig 11 target 
Scott et al 2015 Range trial 17 subjects, each 30 
rds per case 
Hitting rate 10-in round tgt 
modelled as 0.45m 
square 
Zuber 2010 Combat Not specified, 
probably a folk figure 
Hitting rate Stated and from 
beaten zone dims 
WO 291/471 OR model N/A Hitting rate Needed to assume 
troop density 
CDEC 1962 Range trial 20 runs per case Hitting rate Target mix assumed 
Ewell & Hunt 1995 Combat 23 engagements 6 rds/kill, 148m Target size assumed 
Lind et al 1971 OR model N/A Ballistic dispersion  
Spring et al 1971 Combat One battle, 5000 
shots for 4-5 cas 
Rds/cas Tgt size assumed for 
tgts in slit trenches 
Lappi 2012 Range trial  Rounds per hit Tgt size assumed 
Harris 1993 OR model N/A Dispersion Figures “from 
AMSAA” 
Jovanović et al 2012 Range trial 
 
19 shooters each 120 
rounds,  AK, double 
taps, instinctive 
shooting, 15m 
Hitting rate Tgt size given, 
modelled by equal-
area square 0.45m a 
side 
Mayne 1888 Combat One action (Dek 
Sarak, Afghanistan) 
28000 rounds fired, 
50 en killed, 400 yds 
Tgt size assumed 
Hall & Ross, 2009 Combat About 2800 ambushes 
and patrols 
Shots per kill Tgt size assumed 
42% of ambushes at 
night 
Aveni  2003 Police shootings NYPD, 1719 incidents 
Baltimore PD , 75 
encounters, 211 shots 
fired 
Hitting rate by range 
band 
Tgt size assumed 
NYPD 77%, BPD 59% 
in low light conditions 
WO 291/1668 Combat 343 patrols, 315 
ambushes 
Hitting rate Tgt size assumed 
PCD undated Combat One action (Rasau, 
Malaya) 
6000 en rds fired, 7 
friendly cas, 2081 
friendly rds fired, en 
cas unknown, 60 yds 
Tgt size assumed 
















0.5 225 Qual firing M16/M4 Rifle Expert, KD range FM 3-22 9 2008 
0.73 225 Qual firing M16/M4 Rifle Sharpshooter, KD FM 3-22 9 2008 
0.98 23 Range trial Bren MG Single shot WO 291/476 
1.05 23 Range trial .303 rifle Rifle Wpn rested WO 291/476 
1.06 275 Range trial M1917 MG Double E tgt FB 181 1945 
1.1 225 Qual firing M16/M4 Rifle Marksman, KD FM 3-22 9 2008 
1.18 275 Range trial M1919 MG Double E tgt FB 181 1945 
1.35 23 Range trial Bren MG Bursts WO 291/476 
1.55 23 Range trial Sten SMG Singles, rested WO 291/476 
1.56 275 Range trial sMG-42 MG Double E tgt FB 181 1945 
1.81 275 Field trial lMG-34 MG Double E tgt FB 181 1945  
1.89 23 Range trial Sten SMG Singles, unrested WO 291/476 
2.08 73 Range trial AR15 Rifle Unstressed Scott et al 2015 
2.26 23 Range trial Sten SMG Bursts, rested WO 291/476 
2.3 50 Qual firing SLR Rifle High standard CQB 1961 
2.36 700 Combat Mauser 98 Rifle From beaten zone Zuber 2010 
2.39 400 Range trial M14 Rifle Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (CF) 
2.68 400 Range trial M60 MG Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (CF) 
2.68 73 Range trial AR15 Rifle Stressed Scott et al 2015 
3.15 148 Combat M14 Rifle Dark, Sniperscope Ewell & Hunt 1995 
3.47 250 Range trial M14 Rifle Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (CF) 
3.51 23 Range trial Sten SMG Bursts, unrested WO 291/476 
3.68 250 Range trial M60 MG Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (CF) 
3.8 1000 Combat Mauser 98 Rifle From hitting rate Zuber 2010 
3.89 69 Field trial M3 SMG E target FB 181 1945 
4.3 50 Qual firing SLR Rifle Pass standard CQB 1961 
4.57 69 Range trial Thompson SMG E target FB 181 1945 
5.98 90 Range trial M14 Rifle Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (MF) 
6.53 69 Range trial MP40 SMG E target FB 181 1945 
7.0 150 OR model rifle/Bren Rifle/MG Tp dens assumed WO 291/471 
7.19 90 Range trial M60 MG Tgt size assumed CDEC 1962 (MF) 
8.0 75 OR model M16 or AK Rifle From foxhole Lind et al 1971 
8.78 800 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
8.81 700 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
8.84 600 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
8.87 500 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
8.9 400 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 












8.97 300 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
9.0 200 Range trial 7.62 rifle Rifle Tgt size assumed Lappi 2012 
9.12 15 Range trial AK Rifle Trained, rested Jovanović et al 2012 
9.12 200 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
9.64 100 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
9.69 15 Range trial AK Rifle Untrained, rested Jovanović et al 2012 
10.7 15 Range trial AK Rifle Trained, sleepless Jovanović et al 2012 
10.9 15 Range trial .303 rifle Rifle Moving target WO 291/476 
10.97 15.2 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed Aveni  2003 
11.1 50 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
12.25 15 Range trial AK Rifle Untrained, sleepless Jovanović et al 2012 
12.75 200 Range trial SVT Rifle Tgt size assumed Lappi 2012 
12.89 366 Combat Martini Rifle Tgt size assumed Mayne 1888 
14.7 25 OR model M16 Rifle Prone Harris 1993 
17.91 200 Range trial Lahti AR MG Tgt size assumed Lappi 2012 
20.0 75 OR model M16 or AK Rifle From hip Lind et al 1971 
20.5 15 Range trial Sten SMG Bursts, Mvg tgt WO 291/476 
20.7 15 Range trial Sten SMG Singles, Mvg tgt WO 291/476 
21 15 Range trial Bren Rifle Singles, Mvg tgt WO 291/476 
23.51 200 Range trial Suomi SMG Tgt size assumed Lappi 2012 
25.4 70 Combat US carbine Rifle Tgt size assumed, patrol WO 291/1668 
33.65 70 Combat No. 5 rifle Rifle Tgt size assumed, patrol WO 291/1668 
34.5 15 Range trial Bren MG Bursts, Mvg tgt WO 291/476 
36.55 27 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, NYPD Aveni  2003 
36.9 18.7 Police Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, NYPD Aveni  2003 
45.19 70 Combat Owen SMG Tgt size assumed, patrol WO 291/1668 
50.45 5.5 Police Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, BPD Aveni  2003 
50.69 70 Combat Sten SMG Tgt size assumed, patrol WO 291/1668 
52.5 70 Combat Bren MG Tgt size assumed, patrol WO 291/1668 
56.53 33 Combat US carbine Rifle Tgt size assumed, ambush WO 291/1668 
61.79 10.5 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, NYPD Aveni  2003 
64.95 33 Combat No. 5 rifle Rifle Tgt size assumed, ambush WO 291/1668 
67.79 40 Combat AK /RPD Rifle/MG Tgt size assumed, slit trench Spring et al 1971 
71.64 33 Combat Bren MG Tgt size assumed, ambush WO 291/1668 
102.47 4.5 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, NYPD Aveni  2003 
106.14 55 Combat Mixed Mixed Tgt size assumed PCD undated 
110.05 33 Combat Owen/Sten SMG Tgt size assumed, ambush WO 291/1668 












118.43 23 Combat SLR Rifle Tgt size assumed, patrol Hall & Ross 2009 
129.07 23 Combat SLR Rifle Tgt size assumed, ambush Hall & Ross 2009 
131.95 23 Combat M16 Rifle Tgt size assumed, patrol Hall & Ross 2009 
137.79 1.7 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, BPD Aveni  2003 
154.77 23 Combat M16 Rifle Tgt size assumed, ambush Hall & Ross 2009 
165.46 55 Combat Mixed Mixed Tgt size and 1 cas assumed PCD undated 
192.85 23 Combat M60 MG Tgt size assumed, ambush Hall & Ross 2009 
215.68 23 Combat M60 MG Tgt size assumed, patrol Hall & Ross 2009 
286.9 1 Police  Handgun Handgun Tgt size assumed, NYPD Aveni  2003 
 
